


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
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

CONTENTS

[REDACTED]

2. TURKEY'S CONCERN OVER SYRIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. BRITISH AND FRENCH POSITION ON SUEZ SETTLEMENT

[REDACTED]

6. HUNGARIAN DIPLOMAT FEARS MORE EXTREME SOVIET REPRESSION

[REDACTED]

7. POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED LIKELY IN RUMANIA AND BULGARIA

[REDACTED]

8. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL FIGHT CONTINUES

[REDACTED]

9. LIBYA PLANS REVISION OF TREATY WITH BRITAIN

[REDACTED]

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Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

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Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

2. TURKEY'S CONCERN OVER SYRIA

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Turkey intends to present to the North Atlantic Council the "very serious view" which it takes of the situation in Syria and point out that a hostile Syria would outflank NATO and imperil the Baghdad pact. Turkey is also considering a public statement warning the USSR against establishing a base in Syria.

Meanwhile, Turkey is strengthening its armed forces on the Syrian frontier. The American embassy in Ankara, however, believes that Turkey is not likely to take military action without previously consulting the United States, NATO and the Baghdad pact.

While Turkey normally has preferred collective action to counter Soviet efforts in the Middle East, the Turkish government regards current developments in Syria as a direct threat and may feel forced to intervene.

28 Nov 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 4

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

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Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

5. BRITISH AND FRENCH POSITION ON SUEZ SETTLEMENT

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The recent British and French restatements of position on settlement of the Suez Canal issue present qualifications unacceptable to Egypt.

French foreign minister Pineau informed the US UN delegation of a draft plan for a settlement evidently designed to conciliate French public opinion, but which would

be unacceptable to Nasr. The plan calls for an Egyptian authority charged with daily operation of the canal and an association of users to collect and distribute the tolls. Clearance of the canal and its future development would be internationally financed, perhaps through the International Bank.

British foreign secretary Lloyd was instructed to tell Secretary General Hammarskjold that Britain is prepared to establish a definite schedule for withdrawal of its troops, according to Permanent Under Secretary Kirkpatrick. Before announcing a terminal date for evacuation, however, the British want an assurance that Nasr will allow clearing operations to proceed under UN auspices with all "available" equipment. British and French equipment now at the canal or on the way there evidently is sufficient to perform the entire clearing operation without further additions.

Kirkpatrick alleges that discrimination against Britain is already evident in the UN and that he is apprehensive that it will continue "in relation to further steps necessary in the Middle East." Ambassador Aldrich believes that Kirkpatrick clearly accepts the possibility that matters in the Middle East could develop "so that such a drastic step as British withdrawal from the UN would be inevitable."

28 Nov 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

6. HUNGARIAN DIPLOMAT FEARS MORE EXTREME SOVIET REPRESSION

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[redacted] if
[redacted] the Hungarian government is unable to
bring the general strike to an end during the coming week,
the USSR may be forced to eliminate Hungary as a nation.
[redacted] even if the general strike ended, the
government would be unable to provide the necessary raw
materials to get back into production. [redacted]

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Comment

Kadar addressed the Hungarian people on 26 November in the most threatening and harshest terms since becoming premier. He probably fears that the USSR will resort to more extreme measures if his government is not soon able to gain control. The Soviet deportation of ex-premier Nagy, however, has virtually stripped Kadar of any chance of gaining a popular following.

Kadar gave scant reference in this speech to wide-sweeping economic and political concessions. He said that counterrevolutionaries must be "hunted down and rendered harmless" and openly attacked Nagy and "antidemocratic" elements in offices and factories. This suggests a possible purge of the revolutionary and worker councils established during the past month.

Worker resistance continues high and a regime leader, Minister of State Marosan, admitted on 25 November that the workers' councils are "more or less masters of the situation" and that these organizations, in almost all cases, have the "masses at their disposal."

28 Nov 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 9

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800330001-4

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25X1 7. POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED LIKELY IN RUMANIA AND BULGARIA

Popular demonstrations against the regime will begin in Bulgaria shortly before the end of the year, after which they will start in Rumania, where or-

ganized resistance exists,

Trouble in Rumania,

will not begin in Bucharest or the large cities, but will start in the countryside where peasant relations with the agricultural authorities are at a breaking point. Continued heavy agricultural quotas, along with lack of food and fuel, are the main cause of discontent.

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Comment

Popular unrest in the two countries has reached a high point and local antiregime demonstrations are possible.

The American legation in Bucharest continues to report that although outward calm prevails, the Hungarian situation and increasing privation have led to the growth of unrest among the populace, particularly in the countryside, and popular uneasiness has been manifested by some worker and student demonstrations.

Similar economic privations exist in Bulgaria, where the regime has demonstrated increasing concern over popular discontent.

The current talks in Moscow between Rumanian and Soviet leaders will undoubtedly include discussion of Rumanian unrest and methods to combat it. The Rumanian leaders may appeal for increased Soviet economic aid in order to alleviate privation during the winter.

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8. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL FIGHT CONTINUES

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Yugoslavia's leading paper Borba on 27 November vigorously challenges Pravda's most recent editorial on the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy. Borba accuses Pravda of failing to offer any comment on Tito's charge that the bureaucratic system is the "root of Soviet difficulties." It condemns the attack on Yugoslav economic ties with the West as interference in Yugoslavia's affairs and an attempt to "undermine its international prestige."

Borba rephrases Tito's charge that the Soviets have failed to apply the principles of equality in their relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, and declares that anti-Soviet feeling in these countries and the threat of rebellion will not disappear until the Soviets do so. The "old conceptions of the socialist camp are of necessity linked with conceptions of the hegemony of the leading country," according to Borba.

The Borba article, in an apparent effort to thwart any Soviet efforts to isolate Yugoslavia, solicits independent views from other socialist states on the issues raised and quotes Peiping's remarks on 1 November regarding damage to socialist solidarity from "big-nation chauvinism."

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9. LIBYA PLANS REVISION OF TREATY WITH BRITAIN

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
Prime Minister Ben Halim plans to press for revision of the Anglo-Libyan defense treaty of 1953 along two main lines. He wishes to achieve a reduction of British troops in Libya with a parallel increase in size of the Libyan army until the two forces are of approximately equal size. He also wishes to accelerate the removal of British troops from populated centers.

Comment

British military action against Egypt has resulted in a considerable upsurge of anti-British attitudes in Libya, including some sentiment in the Libyan cabinet to abrogate the treaty of 1953. British concern over a reported Soviet military aid offer has already resulted in initiation of talks with the Libyans on implementation of the British promise to help expand the Libyan army of 1,500 to 5,000 by 1961. Britain is supplying \$11,400,000 in aid this year under the treaty. In view of the strategic need for a base in Libya, where about 9,000 British troops are now stationed, London will probably make some concessions.

Ben Halim can probably control the extremists in his government if the British are responsive to his proposals, but can be expected to make tougher demands if rebuffed.

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